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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE ST~\.TE INSURANCE FUND, 
administered by the Commission of 
Finance of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THO:JIAS L. DYKES, THE INDUS-
TRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
and INTERMOUNTAIN SERV-
ICE BUR.EAU, INC., doing busi-





STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendants accept the statement of facts as 
given in the Plaintiff's Brief on file herein, as correct 
but deem it advisable to amplify said statement as 
follows in order to make it complete. 
The policy of insurance, involved herein, was is-
sued by the Plaintiff to J. Martin Stock, dba "Mer-
chants Police'' effective August 20, 1946 and continuing 
until June 30, 1947 (Tr. 63, 64). Mr. Stock changed the 
title of his business establishment from a privately 
owned concern to a corporation about July 1, 1947 (Tr. 
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80) but Mr. Stock still remained an active participant, 
was president of the new company and everything re-
mained the same except the fact of incorporation, even 
the name of "Merchants Police" continued to be used 
( Tr. 55, 80, 81). The employment. of the applicant, T. L. 
Dykes, by the new company, known as the Intermoun-
tain Service Bureau, Inc., was in all material respects 
by the same people and for the same purposes as 
though he had been employed by J. Martin Stock per-
sonally. The only major change in the new company 
was the change of name. In actual contacts and in actual 
business, the name of ''Merchants Police'' was not 
changed but was continued in use. The Utah State In-
surance Fund, the insurance carrier in this case, in-
sured J. Martin Stock, operating as "Merchants Police" 
and when this policy lapsed they made no effort to ad-
vise the Industrial Commission of such lapsation. The 
Utah Insurance Fund received an order which was 
issued by the Industrial Commission to all insurance 
earriers, demanding that a notice 'be given to the Indus-
trial Commission of policy cancellations, based on fail-
ure to pay premiums; but in spite of this order, the 
State Insurance Fund officers elected to ignore the In-
dustrial Commission's order ( Tr. 70 to 73). 
QUESTIONS INVOLVED 
1. Was the Utah State Insurance Fund policy of 
workmen's compensation cancelled when the employer 
incorporated and changed its name? 
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2. Was the order or motion of the Utah State In-
dustrial Commission binding on the Utah State Insur-
ance :B,und so as to continue the Funds Liability over 
the period of time necessary to compensate applicant 
Dykes for his injuries and losses'? 
ARGUJ\IENTS 
.A.RGUJ\IENT ON QUESTION NO. 1 
As far as technical legal entities are concerned, it 
is apparent that the only insurance policy involved in 
this case 'vas written on J. Martin Stock dba "Mer-
chants Police." At the time the policy was written, Mr. 
Stock was no doubt the sole o"\vner and operator of 
said concern. It is also apparent that the technical 
employer of applicant Dykes was the corporation, name-
ly the Intermountain Service Bureau, Inc. Therefore, 
a serious question arises as to whether or not the dif-
ference in these two legal entities is sufficient or should 
be allowed to exclude applicant Dykes from any re-
covery because of injuries or damage; whether or not 
this situation should permit these persons or any per-
sons or combination of persons in like situations to ac-
complish such a change of ownership or a change of 
name so as to be able to avoid, whether intentionally 
performed or not, their obligations under the Work-
men's Compensation Act. Even though a separate con-
cern was organized in this case, it is still important to 
determine who the real employer was and whether the 
mere change of name or the creation of a. new entity, 
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with the same ownership and management, would of 
itself relieve the real employer of liability (Melhus vs. 
Johnson and Sons, (Minn.) 247 N. W. 2). In the case 
now before the court, Mr. Stock was the real owner and 
employer of all help in the original company. He con-
tinued as the president and was undoubtedly a promi-
nent factor, if not the full owner and manager of the 
new company. There is no evidence in the record to 
show the respective interests of any stockholders in the 
new company. Much was made ~f the fact that one Earl 
Lowry was General Manager of the new company and 
hired the applicant Dykes (Tr. 57, 58) but Mr. Lowry's 
interest, whether as owner or mere employee in the ne"r 
company, is not revealed nor was it sho"\\rn at any" 
time in the record that the new corporation had any 
assets. It was disclosed at the hearing, however, that 
the new company continued with the same type of busi-
ness, continued under the same name (Merchants Po-
lice) with no change in address, telephone number or 
telephone listing and with little or no change in letter 
heads or in methods of operation. In fact, it was spe-
cifically admitted that the only difference between the 
old and the new company was the fact that certain 
types of investigations had been added in the operations 
of the new company (Tr. 55, 80, 81). 
It is a well accepted principle of law that the cor-
porate entity of an organization will be disregarded by 
the courts when justice requires it (See 13 Am. Juris. 
pg. 160, sec. 7; Fletcher on Corporations, vol. 1, sections 
41, 44 and 45; Whipple vs. Industrial Commission 
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(.A.riz.) 1~1 Pac. (~) 876: Horovitz on Workmen's Com-
pens:ltion La,v, pg. 229). No corporation should be al-
lo,ver to rover the true substance of an existing situa-
tion s.o as to render an undue advantage to one of the 
parties and permit loss and damage to another, espec-
ially if the damaged party is "'"ithout fault. Certainly 
applicant Dykes, in this case, had a right to rely on the 
fact that compensation insurance was being supplied 
and there is no fault on his part that any question has 
arisen as to 'Yhether or not he was properly covered 
and protected by workmen's compensation insurance. 
The Defendants concede that in an ordinary case, no 
fire, automobile or liability policy is assignable or trans-
ferrable to another owner because of our rules that such 
policies are personal. The Defendants do not dispute 
the cases quoted by the Plaintiff on this rule and further 
concede that if the case before the court is a true, and 
in all respects a case of an assignment of a liability 
policy from one owner to another, without the approval 
of the insured, then the Intermountain Service Bureau, 
Inc., as the new owner of the Merchants Police business, 
would not be covered under the original policy as ori-
ginally issued. The Defendants submit, however, that 
in reality there was no transfer of the business nor was 
there a change of ''ownership or operation''; that the 
mere change of entity should not be allowed as a means 
of working an injustice in this case; and that the case 
before the court is not a true case .of assignment of a 
policy and a transfer of a business, insured by said 
policy. Our problem is really a question as to whether 
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or not the ''ownership and operation'' of the Merchants 
Police remained the same to such .an extent that the 
policy of workmen's compensation, written herein, was 
not automatically cancelled as a result of the cancella-
tion clause contained in the insurance fund policy. We 
call the court's attention to the said cancellation clause 
in the State Insurance Fund policy, which reads as 
follows: 
''If the employer shall transfer his or its 
ownership or operation of the business insured 
by this policy, this policy shall automatically be-
come cancelled. '' (Italics ours) 
A true assignment of a policy involves the actual 
placing of a. new assignee in the p.ositio~ of the former 
insured. It involves the actual switching of one person 
for another and a changing of the personalities involved. 
It is substantially the act of transferring all of .some 
valuable interest or property to another person (John-
son .vs. Brewer, Ga. 68 S. W. 590, 591; Ormond vs. Con-
necticut Mutual Life Insurance Co., N. C. 58 S. E. 997, 
998), or as may be more graphically explained, relative 
to fire insurance policies, there must be a parting from 
the property interest so that the former owner, after 
the transfer, has no further interest or control (Couch 
Encyclopedia of Insurance Law, vol. 6, section 1450d, 
pgs. 5139 and 5142). In other words, the rule against 
an assignment bec.ause of the personal element being 
involved, serves no purpose whatsoever where there is 
no change of personalities or where the identity of the 
original insured remains the same in the new company. 
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This is bera.use the issuance of any policy depends upon 
the character of the insured employer as to his integrity, 
prudence, caution and ability in the management and 
operation of his business and in the selection of his em-
ployt'l'S. This emphasizes the Defendants' position that 
there is in reality no transfer of business and no assign-
ment of the policy involYed in this case. In. the original 
j[erchants Police under I\Ir. Stock as private owner, it 
'-ras his interest that ''Tas the subject of the insurance 
and the insurance policy did not automatically cancel 
on the incorporation of the new company because it 
\ras still this identical interest and still Mr. Stock's in-
terest that remained predominent and which interest 
the policy continued to protect because of Mr. Stock's 
continued relationship in the new company. In order 
for the insurance fund policy to cancel itself, in. accord-
ance with its own terms, as quoted above, the insured 
employer had to "transfer", "ownership or operation" 
of his business. The Defendants submit that there is 
not a single 'Yord of evidence in the record revealing 
the least intent or actual accomplishment of any part 
of the ''transfer'' of any ''ownership or operation.'' 
On the contrary the evidence introduced does reveal 
that outside the mere change in name, everything re-
mained the same including the ''ownership and the 
operation" and that there was no suggestion of any 
"transfer," as required in the quoted cancellation clause 
before it could become operative. 
The Defendants have been unable to locate any 
cases exactly in point 'vhere a change occurred from an 
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independently owned private business to a corporation 
but the Defendants have located several cases where 
changes were made in partnerships. These cases involve 
changes in personnel and changes of name, similar to 
the case before the court. The courts held that these 
slight changes involved no ''assignment to strangers'' 
but involved a retention of substantially the originally 
insured parties and that insurance policy clauses void-
ing policies where real assignments are involved were 
not operating in such cases. (See Couch on Encyclo-
pedia of Insurance Law, vol. 6, section 1450p and cases 
cited thereunder; also Wilson vs. Genesee Mutual In-
surance Co., N. Y. 16 Bart. 511, 512). As a :first premise, 
the Defendants maintain that the Plaintiff's policy did 
not automatically cancel itself when the corporation 
was formed in July of 1947; that the clause quoted 
above, and as worded, does not apply to the facts in this 
case for the reason that the clause in question applies 
only where an actual transfer of the business and prop-
erty to an actual third party or stranger results and 
where there is an actual change in ownership or opera-
tion. Such a transfer did not occur for the reason that 
the business continued with no changes as has been set 
out above. Even though the incorporation of an organi-
zation does technically create a new entity, the Defend-
ants feel that their position is further justified in the 
fact that the law says no such move should be permitted 
to work injustices upon others. Such a move, if sup-
ported by the courts would permit the hiring of new 
men. under a new company· name, without protection to 
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them, 'Yhich is exactly 'Yhat has happened in this case. 
There is no evidence in the record of the financial stand-
ing of this ne"" company, and 'vhere corporations have 
no assets and are excused by the mere change of name 
from liability on policies of 'vorkmen 's compensation, 
the final results to the employee are obvious. We main-
tain the employee needs better protection, that the law 
grants it to him and he is protected under the rules as 
given herein. If the creation of a corporate· entity is 
all that is needed to avoid responsibilities and to work 
injustices, a great field of fraud and disregard of human 
rights would have legal sanction. Our courts, however, 
have long been exercising the right to look beyond the 
entity of a corporation to see that those evils mentioned 
are not accomplished. . Our authorities in support of 
these arguments have been quoted above. Again, in 
conclusion on argument No. 1, we call attention to the 
fact that the liability policy in question should not be 
declared cancelled as of the time of the incorporation 
of the new company. 
ARGUMENT ON QUESTION NO. 2 
The Defendants first premise, as indicated above, 
1s to the effect that the liability policy did not auto-
matically cancel and we now hope to support the argu-
ment that because of the failure of the Insurance Fund 
officials to comply with the law and the duly adopted 
.orders of the Industrial Commission of Utah, the cover ... 
age of the insurance policy in question, continued over 
to and included the time necessary to protect applicant 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Dykes and to make the Plaintiff liable for Mr. Dykes' 
injuries and losses in accordance with its policy and 
therefore, also liable in accordance with the decision 
of the Industrial Commission of Utah, which decision 
is the basis of this appeal. 
Up until May 13, 194 7, sections 43-3-36 and 43-3-37, 
U.C.A., 1943 had been in force and effect but by a 
mere inadvertence, said sections were left out of the 
new insurance code passed by the 194 7 legislature 
(Chap. 63 Laws of Utah, 1947) and were thereby re-
pealed. Section 43-3-36, being the important section in 
this case, is herewith quoted and reads as follows: 
''Every insurance company authorized to 
transact the business of workmen's compensation 
insurance arid occupational disease insurance 
must write and carry all risks or insurance for 
which application is made to it, which are not pro-
hibited by the provisions of Section 43-3-22, and 
any such insurance company assuming such a 
risk shall carry it to the conclusion of the policy 
period unless canceled, either by agreement be-
tween the industrial commission and the employer 
or in case of nonpayment of premium by thirty 
days' notice by such insurance company to the 
industrial comission and the employer.'' 
Through th~ above entitled section, before its re-
peal, the Industrial Commission of Utah was able to 
compel all insurance carriers t~ let the commission lmo'v 
when a policy of insurance lapsed for nonpayment of 
premium or when a cancellation was desired or accomp-
lished. By this law and this system the Industrial Com-
10 
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mission performed a very worthy function and a great 
service to the \vorking man by standing as a watchman 
and protecting the employees on their liability cover-
age to \vhirh they are entitled by la\v. 
\V.ith the repeal of this section, which in the history 
of the Legislature was actually left out inadvertently 
and for no other purpose 'vhatsoever, the Utah Indus-
trial Commission \vas left without the direct authority 
sufficient to continue to perform that particular service 
and to know when liability coverage lapsed and em-
ployees \Yere not being protected. Very shortly after 
the repeal, eYents occurred showing that a lot of serious 
losses to employees were actually· resulting and would 
continue to result if some steps were not taken to re-
place said law through some form of authorized action. 
As a result of the Industrial Commission's effort to 
perform the service referred to, to perform their obli-
gations relative to keeping all employees insured and 
to perpetuating, as far as was legal, the benefits 
of this repealed section, an order or rule was duly 
adopted by the State Industrial Commission on October 
14, 1947 and copies thereof were sent to the Plaintiff 
and to all other insurance carriers in the· state of Utah, 
again requiring that the provisions of these sections be 
followed and making it necessary, particularly, that 
notice be sent to the State Industrial Commission of 
any policies being cancelled for nonpayment of pre-
mium. For. reasons of time and space, said order is 
not quoted herewith but is hereby incorporated by 
reference and is to be found in the transcript of record 
11 
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on page 89. A copy of this order or motion was sent to 
and was received by the Plaintiff and no objections were 
ever raised by said Plaintiff relative to the require-
ments of said order until the hearing on this case ( Tr. 
70 to 73). 
The Defendants' first observation in relation to 
said order and the provisions of the sections in ques-
tion before they were repealed is to the effect that these 
sections were in force and stiil effecti7e up to and in-
cluding May 13, 1947 (see Chap. 63, Law·s of Utah, 1947). 
It is further to be noted that the policy of insurance 
issued by the Plaintiff to J. Martin Stock dba Merchants 
Police was effective beginning 12 :01 A.M., August 20, 
1946 ( Tr. 63). This means that the provisions of sec-
tions 43-3-36 and 43-3-37 were automatically included 
and were part of the policy of the Plaintiff which was 
issued to, and covered the Merchants Police and that 
from this standpoint, alone, the Plaintiffs' own policy, 
during all times herein, has made the Plaintiff respon-
sible for the giving of a 30 days notice to the Industrial 
Commission of any intent to cancel this policy or any 
other policy for nonpayment of premium. It is a \Yell 
established principle that the statutes of a state, ap-
plicable to any contract of insurance in force at the 
time of the making of a contract, forms and becomes 
a part thereof and must be read in construing the 
policy and. said statute controls in case of conflict (see 
44 C.J.S. on Insurance, section 302; also 29 Am. Juris. 
on Insurance, section 108). This principle of law, alone, 
makes the Plaintiff liable to the applicant Dykes under 
12 
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the terms of its O"\\Tn poliey. The Plaintiff makes a point 
of the fnrt that the Utah State Insurance Fund is not a 
rompany, that the ln\Y and the commissioners' order 
specifies insurance companies as those required to give 
notire and, of course, Plaintiff maintains that the in-
surance fund is not a company and is, therefore, not 
required to giYe said notice. Insurance carriers go by 
various names, such as companies, associations, under-
writers, reciprocals and also by the name of insurance 
and assurance and other names so that the use of such 
a distinction to a~oid obligations under such provisions 
as are here involved has never been supported by the 
la.\v and should not be supported. In order to give pur-
pose to the la'v there can be no doubt but that the term 
''insurance company'' as in the sections above quoted, 
applies to all insurance carriers. The Utah Insurance 
Fund is no doubt properly classified as a stat~ institu-
tion, but the law is further emphatic about the fact that 
state institutions must also abide by the law. State in-
stitutions should set examples to the public and cer-
tainly it must be said that neither the purpose of such 
a la\v nor the good that results nor the harm that can 
be done by either observing or failing to observe such 
a law is lessoned or changed merely because a state in-
stitution is involved. The Defendant submits that the 
Plaintiff is and should also be among those required 
by the law or the order to observe its provisions. 
Even if the Defendants should be left to their 
rights, if any, under the order or motion of October 14, 
1947, we desire to point out the following. The Indus-
13 
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trial Comm.ission has no powers to legislate but they 
do have the power necessary to accomplish the objects 
of the State Workmen's compensation Act and to ac-
complish all the objects which are incidental to the 
powers already granted to them (Utah Copper ·Co. vs. 
Industrial Commission, 57 Utah 118). Further, the 1947 
Legislature, effective as of May 13, 1947, enacted section 
43-19-13 of Chap. 63, Laws of Utah, 1947, which section 
reads as follows : 
''All Insurance companies writing work-
men's compensation insurance and occupational 
disease insurance in this state, and the Commis-
sion of Finance in connection with its administra-
tion of the State Insurance Fund, shall be subject 
to the rules and regulations of the Industrial Com-
mission. Said Commission may provide the meth-
ods to be used by them in the payment of compen-
sation and benefits. The Industrial Commission 
may provide uniform rates to be charged by such 
companies but such rates need not be uniform 
'\Vith the rates fixed for the State Insurance 
Fund.'' 
This section clearly puts the Plaintiff subject to 
the rules, regulations and orders of the Industrial Com-
mission so long as the Industrial Commission stays 
within the limitations set out by our Supreme Court in 
the Utah Copper case, supra, and the Defendants sub-
mit that certainly the purposes of the order is within 
the purposes of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act. 
The practice of notifying the Industrial Commission or 
comparable commissions in other states, of an inten-
14 
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tion to cancel a liability policy is "'ell acrepted by most, 
if not a1l stntl•s and courts. This practire has shown 
itself to he a Yery essential factor to the more complete 
performance of the Industrial Commission's function in 
the supervising of 'Yorkmen ·s compensation la-\vs. 
On page 10 of the Plaintiff's Brief, one Schneider 
on \Vorkmen 's Compensation is quoted out of his Vol. 
2, of said 'Yorks, Section 468, page 1588. The Plain-
tiff did not complete that author's quotation and the 
Defendants submit the balance, which reads as follows : 
''The provision of an insurance policy for 
cancellation by sending to an employer at his last 
known residence, a notice by registered mail 10 
days prior to the time such cancellation takes 
effect, and at the same time giving notice of can-
cellation to the compensation commission, as well 
as the New York statutory provisions for can-
cellation are met, where a registered letter has 
been sent and has arived at its proper destination 
10 days prior to the date of cancellation, although 
the name of the employer and the name of the 
town are misspelled, and although the emplo~er 
does not actually receive the notice, where he has 
ignored notices that a registered letter is ready 
for delivery, and it is returned to the company 
nearly three weeks later; and where the com-
mission was likewise notified of the cancellation 
at the same time.'' 
See also 107 A.L.R., 1519. 
15 
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CONCJ..JUSION 
In conclusion Defendants submit that there was no 
automatic cancellation of the employer's policy in this 
case for the reasons given herein, that the plaintiff gave 
the new company until Nov. 12, 1947 (one day after ap-
plicant Dykes' first injury) to pay the premium and 
before the policy would lapse. Further, the failure of 
the Plaintiff to abide by the order of the Industrial 
Commission makes said Plaintiff liable for applicant 
Dykes' losses in accordance with the decision and award 
of the Industrial Commission. That the Plaintiff is 
liable under the law and the order of the Commission 
because they are subject to the Commission's orders 
and also because the law in question was in force when 
said policy was issued. Defendants request that the 
award and decision of the Industrial Commission be 
. sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GROVER A. GILES, 
Attorney General 
C. N. OTTOSEN, 
Assistant Attorney General 
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